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Sammendrag: USAs president George W. Bush har 
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derfor noen anslag på virkningene av å gjennomføre 
Kyotoprotokollen uten deltagelse fra USA.  Fordi 
USA i praksis skulle tatt en ganske stor del av 
Kyotoprotokollens forpliktelser om 
utslippsreduksjoner, er konklusjonen at gjennomføring 
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globale utslippsreduksjoner. Den internasjonale 
kvoteprisen vil bli betydelig lavere dersom USA ikke 
deltar. 
 
   
 
Abstract: American president George W. Bush has 
declared that he will not ask the Senate to ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol. This commentary explores the 
potential impact of implementing the Kyoto Protocol 
without the participation of the United States. 
Because, in practice, the United States would have 
taken on a relatively large share of the Protocol’s 
abatement commitments, we conclude that 
implementing the Protocol without the participation of 
United States will lead to significantly less reductions 
in global emissions. The international permit price will 
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The Kyoto Protocol, which was negotiated in 1997, requires all industrialized countries to 
limit their emissions of a basket of six greenhouse gases (or groups of gases) for the period 
2008–2012. In all, the agreement requires that the average annual emissions of industrialized 
countries in the period 2008–2012 not exceed 95 percent of 1990 emissions. 
 All industrialized countries, including the United States, have signed the agreement. The 
agreement will not enter into force, however, until it has been ratified by at least 55 countries, 
and these ratifying countries must have contributed at least 55 percent of the industrialized 
world’s CO2 emissions in 1990.1  
 President George W. Bush has now made it clear that he does not intend to send the 
Kyoto Protocol to the Senate for ratification. And irrespective of Bush’s position, the Protocol 
is unlikely to have garnered the necessary 2/3 majority in the Senate to achieve ratification. It 
thus does not appear as if the United States, despite the signature from the previous 
administration, wishes to join the effort to bring the Protocol into force. 
 President Bush’s decision has ignited a discussion among the remaining industrialized 
countries about whether or not to implement the Protocol in the absence of the United States. 
Because the United States was responsible for “only” 36 percent of the industrialized 
countries’ CO2 emissions in 1990, the Protocol can – in principle – enter into force without 
ratification by the United States. This would, however, require virtually all of the other major 
industrialized countries – including Russia, which was responsible for 17 of the industrialized 
countries’ CO2 emissions – to ratify the Protocol. 
To evaluate the impacts of implementing the Kyoto Protocol without the United States, 
we have taken our point of departure in a numerical static partial-equilibrium model that 
integrates energy markets with an international market for emissions trading. The model is 
used to compare the impacts of the Kyoto Protocol both with and without the participation of 
the United States. The main results from the model calculations are that, if the Kyoto Protocol 
is implemented without the participation of the United States, then 
• the effect on global emissions will be reduced from small to insignificant, and 
 
• the international permit price will be reduced to one third of what it would have been 
if the United States had upheld its commitments.    
 
2 Description of the numerical model and dataset 
We apply a static partial equilibrium model developed at CICERO (Center for International 
Climate and Environmental Research – Oslo) that emphasizes the links between the fossil fuel 
markets and a market for emissions permits under the Kyoto Protocol.2 The model divides the 
world into 32 countries and regions. In each country or region, a numeraire good is produced 
using four inputs: oil, coal, gas, and non-CO2 climate gases. The three fossil fuels are 
modeled as substitutes, while the marginal product of non-CO2 gases is independent of the 
use of fossil fuels. The assumed production technology yields a linear demand function for all 
inputs.  
 There are five markets for fossil fuels: one global oil market, one global coal market, and 
three regional gas markets (North America, Asia, and Europe including Russia). Furthermore, 
                                                     
1 Ratification means that the agreement is approved by the country’s legislative body. 
 
2 A more detailed description of the model and some possible impacts of the Kyoto Protocol with the 
participation of the United States is found in Holtsmark and Mæstad, 2000. 
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there is an international market for emissions permits across all the industrialized countries 
with emissions caps under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex B countries). All markets are assumed 
to be competitive except for the oil market, where it is assumed that OPEC behaves 
strategically and restricts its oil supply in order to increase the oil price.  The model 
determines equilibrium prices in the fuel markets and the market for emissions permits as 
well as the different countries’ and regions’ export and import of fossil fuels and emissions 
permits.  
 The model is calibrated to a scenario of the world economy and world energy markets in 
year 2010.  The “business as usual” (BAU) scenario is constructed by taking the Conventional 
Wisdom (CW) scenario developed by the European Commission, 1996, as our baseline. The 
total growth in emissions from 1990 to 2010 in USA, Annex B countries excluding USA, and 
in the rest of the world is set to 24, 8, and 50 percent, respectively.   
 The abatement cost follows implicitly from the formulation of the demand functions and 
the elasticity of demand for each fuel in each country. There is no consensus in the literature 
about demand elasticities in fossil fuel markets. Estimates range from –0.15 (Smith et al., 
1995) to less than –1.0 (see e.g. Golombek and Bråten, 1994 and Golombek, Hagem and Hoel 
1995). For lack of decisive evidence, we have chosen a middle road by assuming average 
demand elasticities of –0.5 for all fossil fuels. Demand elasticities for oil and coal have, 
however, been differentiated across countries in order to reflect the different structures of fuel 
demand in different countries. By using detailed information from the IEA, 1995, the 
consumption of oil and coal in each country has been divided into two parts, one which is 
inelastic and one which presumably is more elastic.  
 Projected producer prices in 2010 are taken directly from the European Commission 
study (op.cit), except in the case of the gas market, where the study reports only one gas price. 
We have taken the gas price to be the European gas price, while the other gas prices have 
been calculated under the assumption that relative gas prices between the three markets will 
be as projected by the IEA, 1998.  
 Consumer prices in the BAU scenario are obtained by adding existing fiscal taxes to the 
producer prices.  
 As for fuel supply, it is generally recognized that the supply of coal is more elastic than 
the supply of other fuels. We have followed Golombek and Bråten, 1994, by assuming supply 
elasticities of 2.0 for coal producers and .75 for both gas producers and competitive oil 
producers.  
3 Calculating emissions reductions with and without the 
participation of the United States  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the Kyoto Protocol requires industrialized countries to 
reduce emissions in the period 2008–2012 by an average of 5 percent in relation to 1990 
levels. Given the figures that we have used in this commentary, this would require 
industrialized countries to reduce their emissions by an average of 12.8 percent from current 
BAU emissions.3  
 The global emissions reduction resulting from the Protocol will, however, be 
significantly less. This is because the Kyoto Protocol does not place any restrictions on 
emissions from developing countries. Emissions from developing countries constituted 45 
                                                     
3 Emissions for industrialized countries as a whole are expected to increase by 9 percent from 1990 to 
the first commitment period (2008–2012) if the Protocol is not implemented, that is, under a “business 
as usual” scenario (BAU).  
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percent of the global emissions in 1990, and they are expected to increase by 50 percent up to 
the period 2008–2012 if the Kyoto Protocol does not enter into force. Furthermore, because 
the Kyoto Protocol will result in a drop in the market price (producer price) of fossil energy, 
developing countries are expected to increase their emissions even more should the Protocol 
enter into force (carbon leakage). The model calculations estimate that all in all the global 
emissions reduction during the first commitment period will be about 5.5 percent, if the 
United States implements the agreement. 
 The model calculations predict that the Kyoto Protocol without the United States means 
that the global emissions will be reduced only by 0.9 percent relative to BAU. The reason that 
the global effect of the climate agreement becomes so minimal if the United States drops out 
is related to three conditions. First, US emissions of greenhouse gases made up a large portion 
of the industrialized countries’ emissions in 1990 (32%). Second, in accordance with the 
Kyoto Protocol, the United States must reduce its emissions by 7 percent, which is higher 
than the average of 5 percent for the industrialized countries as a whole. Third, the expected 
increase in BAU emissions in the United States is higher than average for the industrialized 
countries. If the United States were to uphold its Kyoto commitments, emissions would have 
been 27 percent lower than in the BAU scenario. The comparable figure for the other 
industrialized countries is (on average) 3.4 percent. 
 Thus implementing the Kyoto Protocol without the participation of the United States 
means that the global impact becomes minimal, both because the United States was 
responsible for a large share of the industrialized countries’ total emissions in 1990, but also 
because the Kyoto Protocol set particularly stringent abatement requirements for the United 
States in the period 2008–2012 compared to BAU emissions. 
Protocol with US participation

















Figure 1: Simulated emissions reductions and flows in the quota market if the United 
States implements the climate agreement. The black bars on the right hand side 
represent permit import, while black bars on the left hand side represent permit export. 
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4 The permit market 
The calculations assume that there is unrestricted permit trade between the industrialized 
countries. The Kyoto Protocol also allows for the industrialized countries to meet some of 
their commitments by reducing emissions in developing countries through the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). Because the regulatory framework for the CDM is still 
under development, it is difficult to estimate how this mechanism will function in practice, 
and is therefore not incorporated into the model calculations. It is clear, however, that the 
permit price will be lower if this mechanism is brought into use. 
 
4.1 The permit market with the participation of the United States  
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of emissions reductions and the flows in the quota market 
given the participation of the United States. With respect to emissions trading, we see that the 
United States is the main buyer, while Russia and other Eastern European countries are the 
main sellers. The United States also represents a large portion of the emissions reductions, 
nearly 1100 million tons4 of CO2 equivalents compared to a total global reduction of just 
under 2300 million tons of CO2 equivalents in this scenario. The emissions increases that take 
place in developing countries result from carbon leakage related to the drop in price of fossil 
fuels. We can also note that the emissions reductions in Russia and the other Eastern 
European countries are less than the permit export from these countries. This is a case of 
selling permits without undertaking corresponding domestic reductions and is related to the 
generous quota allotments for these countries, which allows them to sell hot air. 
Here, the permit price is calculated at about USD 15 per ton CO2.5  
 
4.2 The permit market in the absence of the United States  
Figure 1 illustrates how important the United States is for the Kyoto Protocol. Without the 
participation of the United States, a large portion of the emissions reductions is eliminated, at 
the same time as the demand for quotas on the international market drops dramatically. Figure 
2 illustrates the results of the US withdrawal. Global abatement is reduced from 2300 million 
tons to less than 400 million tons. Even though the participation of the United States would 
have meant a US abatement of just over 1000 million tons, the withdrawal of the United 
States means that global emissions will be almost 2000 million tons higher. This is derived 
clearly from the fact that the quota allocated to the United States is, in this particular scenario, 
almost 2000 million tons less than the country’s BAU emissions. The permits that the United 
States would have imported now become available to other countries. 
 The withdrawal of the United States results in the permit price falling from USD 15 per 
ton CO2 equivalent to only USD 5. The considerable price drop corresponds well with the 
picture we have already painted of how important the US emissions cap is to the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
 We see that the emissions trading in this scenario is mainly based on hot air. Abatement 
carried out by the permit exporters in this scenario is far less than the extent of permit export 
should indicate. 
                                                     
4 In this paper, we use “tons” to mean “metric tons.” 
 
5 The literature provides a number of different estimates of quota prices resulting from the Kyoto 
Protocol. In a special edition of the Energy Journal (see Weyant, 1999), various studies are presented of 
the impacts of the Kyoto Protocol. The introductory chapter by Weyant and Hill, 1999, compares 
eleven different models calculations of the quota price in a non-restricted market between Annex B 
countries. The quota prices vary from USD 7 to USD 61 per ton CO2. In eight of the model calculations 
the quota price was under USD 20 per ton CO2. 
CICERO Working Paper 2001: 07 




Protocol without US participation

















Figure 2: Simulated emissions reductions and flows in the permit market should the 
United States withdraw from the agreement. The black bars on the right hand side 
represent permit import, while the black bars on the left hand side represent permit 
export.  
5 Restricted emissions trading  
As illustrated by Figure 2, without the participation of the United States, emissions trading 
will largely be based on hot air. The Kyoto Protocol stipulates that the Parties may participate 
in emissions trading, but that such trading should be supplementary to domestic abatement 
measures. EU and other countries favor regulations that would restrict permit sales that do not 
correspond with domestic abatement. In 1999, the EU Council of Ministers submitted a 
proposal that would put a ceiling, or cap, on the right to both purchase and sell permits 
(UNFCCC (1999)). In practice this proposal is unlikely to effectively restrict permit buying. 
However, it will put effective restrictions on sales of quotas from countries with hot air. 6  It is 
unclear whether the EU will still wish to uphold this restriction should the Protocol enter into 
force without the participation of the United States. To evaluate the effects of possible 
restrictions on the sale of hot air also in an agreement that does not include the United States, 
we have taken a look at the impact of implementing the EU proposal in the absence of US 
participation. With the EU proposal, the permit price will jump from USD 5 to USD 16. The 
resulting 7.3 percent reduction in emissions in Annex B countries, excluding the United 





                                                     
6 The effect of this is discussed in greater detail in Holtsmark and Mæstad, 2000. 
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Table 1. Effects of the Kyoto Protocol with and without the participation of the United 
States  






countries (in % of 
BAU) 
Global emissions 
reduction (in % of 
BAU) 
Kyoto Protocol with 
the United States. 
Unrestricted trading. 
15  12.8 5.5 
Kyoto Protocol 
without the United 
States. Unrestricted 
trading. 
5 3.7 0.9 
Kyoto Protocol 
without the United 
States. Restricted 
trading. 
16 7.3 1.8 
     
6 Summary and conclusion 
Table 1 summarizes the results. When the United States withdraws from the agreement, 
calculations show that the permit price drops from USD 15 to USD 5 per ton CO2 equivalent 
under unrestricted trading. This dramatic price drop is a clear illustration of much of what has 
been said about the importance of the participation of the United States to the Kyoto Protocol. 
 The second and third columns of table 1 show the impact of the Protocol on emissions 
reductions within participating countries and on global emissions. The emissions reduction is 
here given in relation to what emissions would be if the Kyoto Protocol does not enter into 
force (BAU). We can state unequivocally that emissions reductions would be negligible 
without the participation of the United States, particularly if sales of hot air are not restricted. 
Whether the Kyoto Protocol should be kept alive or scrapped thus depends on factors other 
than the direct emissions reductions that would result. The question becomes what is 
considered to be the optimal policy in the long run. If the global emissions are to be reduced 
considerably, it is essential to have an agreement that contributes to reducing emissions both 
from the United States and from the developing countries. The key issue is whether the Kyoto 
Protocol without the participation of the United States is the best starting point for working 
toward such an agreement. 
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